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Abstract 
 
This chapter attempts to challenge the stigmatic ambiguity of the reflective practice 
by discussing the characteristics of ‘reflection’ in connection with ‘experience’. 
Identifying that reflection is an act directed to experience, the author approaches the 
essential features of reflective practice by explicating the notion of ‘experience.’ The 
discussion takes two steps. First, various definitions of reflection from different 
fields are compared based on such categories as context, sources of reflection, 
purposes and methods, then five characteristic features of reflection are extracted. 
With these features of reflection in scope, the second step examines the range of the 
concept of experience focusing on its depth, broadness and dynamics. Analyses were 
made from such angles as experiential, phenomenological, critical, cultural, 
narrative and processual perspectives. What emerged through the discussion are as 
follows: 1) Reflection is directed toward experience, 2) reflective practice is a 
process of making sense of an experience, 3) experience is a complex, 
multi-dimensional and dynamic process which is always open to new understanding, 
4) the complexity and multi-dimensional feature of experience may be a reason of 
versatile definitions and theoretical ambiguity of reflective practice., 5) due to this 
complexity and multi-dimensionality of experience, practitioner-researchers are 
expected of articulating his/her own epistemological framework to view experience, 
6) use of versatile available theories will help achieving richer accounts of 
experience, 7) we need to be aware of the use of multiple perspectives to approach 
experience through reflective practice. Thus existence of versatile definition should 
not be thought problematic so long as we know how we view the experience. 
Key words: reflective practice, experience, phenomenology, narrative, 
practitioner-researcher
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1. Introduction 
As an instructor of a language teacher development program, I come across stories 
of my student-teachers who are engaged in the context of teaching English in Japan. 
I require them to maintain a journal of their daily experiences and post one to the 
web once a week. All the participants including me give feedback to each other. 
Posted journals are often emotional and confusing reflecting the harsh realities of 
their classrooms. They are about conflicts with students who had lost motivation in 
studying English long ago and are acting out in frustration, those who come to the 
class without doing their homework and sleep in the class, and those who cannot 
read a simple word like “the” or “airplane” after 5 years of learning English. For 
data-oriented researchers such individual issues are just too messy to be put into a 
research formula, and as a result they are rarely taken up as research themes. It is 
obvious that positivistic views of experience do not properly respond to numerous 
inquiries from the classroom.  
 
Research from a hard science paradigm, naturally, finds little space to fill in those 
voids with appropriate accounts. Voices inside practitioners’ heads also murmur, 
“Are there any ways available to approach teachers' experiences in the classroom? Is 
there any way to bring back research from academics and put it in the hands of 
teachers so that they can grow for themselves by answering their own inquiries?” 
 
Problems we encounter are not found in the laboratory but at the crossroads of 
learner’s past and present, the classroom and the community and the here-and-now 
interaction between teachers and students. They are buried in descriptive records 
awaiting analysis. What is being awaited is a research framework for practitioners.  
 
In an attempt to respond to these questions, I take up reflective practice as a possible 
approach for practitioners to respond to the realities in the classroom and examine 
how it opens paths to better understandings in teaching and learning.  
 
Reflective practice, systematic practice of reflecting on one’s experiences as a means 
of practitioner research, however, is not free from criticism. Most of its criticism is 
about its ambiguity as a concept: “conceptual confusion surrounding reflective 
practice” (Kinsella, 2009), “vague slogan” (McLaughlin, 1999) and subsequent 
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unsureness of practitioners to know whether their practices are properly done, and 
amongst of all this, unsureness about what it is to ‘reflect’ (Rodgers, 2002; Finlay, 
2008; Burton, 2009). Where to set goals also varies. There are definitions that stress 
reflection as an intervention aiming at personal or professional change (Taggart and 
Wilson, 1998; Farrel1, 2004). As Farrel's comment on his use of personal change in 
his definition shows, part of the ambiguity issue may be attributed to the 
indefinability of goals of reflection in that nobody knows what change may happen 
or what new understanding one reaches. With these stigmatic ambiguities and lack 
of common understanding in scope, we might have to go back to the reasons 
underlying this ambiguity and know what it is that makes the creation of an 
understandable definition difficult. Or if it is even possible after all? What is needed 
now is to examine the broadness and depth of the concept of ‘reflection’ rather than 
seek for one clear-cut definition with which everybody can agree.   
 
What I aim to do in this chapter are 1) to approach this fundamental concept of what 
it is to reflect by shining a light upon some of its key concepts by comparing 
definitions of reflection from different professional contexts, 2) to discuss varieties 
of perspectives the reflective practitioners can take focusing on their core concepts 
and 3) to carve out a holistic image of reflective practice by probing its ideational 
broadness and depth. 
 
2. Experience as a core notion of reflective practice 
2.1  Comparison of definitions on reflection 
I would like to begin my discussion by introducing some of the given definitions of 
reflection and explore common features embedded in them. Five of the definitions 
on reflection I introduce here are selected from different professional contexts. The 
quotes are a bit lengthy, but were thought to be necessary as a minimum as accounts 
of reflection. All of them are definitions by practitioner-researchers who have been 
working in the field. The closeness of these researchers to the field is also a reason 
of selection as sources for comparison. It was hypothesized that the versatility of 
                                                     
1 Referring to Taggart and Wilson (1998), Farrel (2004) presents a following definition: “Putting these 
concepts together in one definition, reflective practice is a systematic and structured process in which we 
look at concrete aspects of teaching and learning with the overall goal of personal change and more 
effective practice. By change, I do not only mean behavioral adaptations toward teaching methods. 
Hopefully, we change as a result of the awareness brought about by engaging in reflections” (p. 27).  
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definition is due partly to the difference of practice in each field and the depth and 
broadness of the concepts of reflection has this versatility as its landscape. 
As known researchers and educators of Action Research, Kemmis and McTaggart 
(1988, the 3rd edition) introduced the following definition of reflection.  
 
1) Reflection recalls action as it has been recorded in observation, but it is 
also active. Reflection seeks to make sense of processes, problems, 
issues and constraints made manifest in strategic action. It takes 
account of the variety of perspectives possible in the social situation 
and comprehends the issues and circumstances in which they arise. 
Reflection is usually aided by discussion among participants. Through 
discourse, group reflection leads to the reconstruction of the meaning 
of the social situation and provides the basis for the revised plan. 
Reflection has evaluative aspect – it asks action researchers to weigh 
their experiences – to judge whether effects (and issues which arose) 
were desirable, and suggest ways of proceeding. But there is also a 
sense in which reflection is descriptive – it allows reconnaissance, 
building a more vivid picture of life and work in the situation, 
constraints on action and more importantly, of what might now be 
possible, for the group, and for its individual members as actors 
committed to group goals. (pp. 13-14) 
 
Second is Johns (2009)’ description on reflection in his popular textbook (4th 
edition) for training nurses as a way of thinking deeply and carefully about self 
within the context of one’s practice. He defines reflection as follows. 
 
2) I currently formally describe reflection as ‘Being mindful of self, 
either within or after experience, as if a mirror in which the 
practitioner can view and focus self within the context of a particular 
experience, in order to confront, understand and move towards 
resolving contradiction between one’s vision and actual practice.  
Through the conflict of contradiction, commitment to realize one’s 
vision, and understanding why things are as they are, the practitioner 
can gain new insight into self and be empowered to respond more 
26
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congruently in future situations within a reflexive spiral towards 
developing practical wisdom and realizing one’s vision as praxis.  
The practitioner may require guidance to overcome resistance or to be 
empowered to act on understanding.’ (p. 2) 
 
The third is the one by Bolton (2014, the 4th edition), also from nursing education 
context.   
 
3) Reflection is in-depth review of events, either alone – say, in a journal 
– or with critical support with a supervisor or group. The reflector 
attempts to work out what happened, what they thought or felt about it, 
who was involved, when and where, what these others might have 
experienced and thought and felt about it from their own perspective. 
Most significantly, the reflector considers WHY?, and studies 
significant theory and texts from the wider sphere. It is to bring 
experiences into focus from as many angles as possible: people, place, 
relationships, timing, chronology, casualty, connections, the social and 
political context, and so on. Seemingly innocent ideas might prove to 
be key; seemingly vital details may be irrelevant, or lead to insight 
about something unnoticed at the time, pinpointing perhaps when the 
seemingly innocent detail was missed. (p. 7) 
Reflective practice can enable discovery of who and what we are, why 
we act as we do, and how we can be much more effective. (p. 10) 
 
Fourth is Dawson and Kelin’s (2014, 1st edition) definition. They position the use of 
reflection in their teaching of drama and theatrical arts context. 
 
4) Reflection is central to learning in a variety of ways. When a Teaching 
Artist works with participants to collaboratively shape her process 
through a discussion of common goals and desired impact, she learns.  
As he unpacks an experience to understand what happened, examining 
it from as many perspectives as possible, he learns. When a Teaching 
Artist considers how to apply the experience to a repeated or new 
action, she learns. Greater than thinking simply about what she is 
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doing, more than ending a session with “What did you learn today?”, 
reflection requires investigation and interrogation. For learning to truly 
be beneficial it should stem from intentional dialogue with self or 
others throughout a process.  Then, the learner can consciously and 
purposefully apply the past to present to new situations or experiences. 
Through this inquiry process, a Teaching Artist develops an awareness 
of the available choices in any situation and begins to recognize how to 
achieve the results he most desires. This is called Reflective practice. 
(pp. 28-29) 
 
Fifth is the definition by Rodgers (2002) based on her redefining work of John 
Dewey’s thoughts on reflection. She introduces it as Dewey’s four criteria for 
reflection. 
 
5)  1  Reflection is a meaning-making process that moves a learner from 
one experience into the next with deeper understanding of its 
relationships with and connections to other experiences and ideas. 
It is the thread that makes continuity of learning possible, and 
ensures the progress of the individual and, ultimately, society. It is 
a means to essentially moral ends. 
2. Reflection is a systematic, rigorous, disciplined way of thinking, 
with its roots in scientific inquiry. 
3. Reflection needs to happen in community, in interaction with 
others. 
4. Reflection requires attitudes that value the personal and 
intellectual growth of oneself and of others. 
28
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To probe commonalities and differences between the above definitions, I sort them 
with four criteria: Context (where), sources of reflection (on what), purposes/goals 
(why) and methods (how). (See table 1).  
 
What appears as common features among reflection across the fields are 1) 
reflection is a means to research the practice grounded in contexts, 2) reflection is an 
act directed toward experience, 3) the foremost purpose of reflection is in the 
understanding of an experience, 4) reflection is a continual process and open for 
change, 5) reflection is a dialogic and collaborative work. 
 
This multi-faceted feature of reflection poses a valuable implication to the 
discussion of experience in the next step. Learning that reflection is a dynamic social 
act directed toward experience which is grounded in context, then reflective 
practitioners need versatile epistemological lenses to view experience from different 
angles with different stances. What we would like to know now is how experience 
can be viewed, in other words, how we can approach experience and what 
epistemological lenses are available to us. 
   
2.2  Experience 
Now I would like to shift my focus to ‘experience’ because that is what the act of 
reflection is sourced from and directed to and it receives the practitioner’s attention. 
Without experience, no practitioner can initiate his/her practice of reflection. In 
contrast to the need of considering reflection in the relation of experience, we find 
ourselves knowing too little about it. Noye (2009) criticizes past empiricist 
philosophers’ work saying  
 
When it comes to the concept of ‘experience,’ we have been given only 
very poor content in the philosophical context. Empiricist philosophers in 
particular have been recognizing experience as mere ‘perceptual cognition’ 
in a moment or ‘the reception of perceptual affordance’. What critically 
lacks here is understanding [experience] on the temporal extendedness and 
the contextual sphere of experience that makes experience ‘experience’ and 
also the recognition of the linguistic aspect that performs a crucial role in 
30
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constituting experience. (p. 81, originally written in Japanese and was 
translated by the author)  
 
I haven’t come across any better criticism on the philosophers’ work on the take of 
experience than this. We are practitioners living deeply in experience. Experiences 
we reflect on are real and are experienced bodily in context. If experience needs to 
be looked at from different angles, we want to know what angles are available. We 
just want to know more about experience trying to find answers to such simple 
questions as what ‘experience’ is and how it is to be looked at.  
 
Thus, pinning down ‘experience’ as a focused key word, analysis of reflection is 
going to be made integrating further its expansive dimensions. With this scheme in 
mind, I set my basic stance toward reflective practice as “an approach to experience” 
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by Dewey (1933/ 1938), Shön (1983), Manen (1990) and the literature of other 
areas: philosophy, anthropology and clinical psychology in particular. Chosen 
theoretical frames are the ones with which to examine the multi-faceted features of 
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3. Perspectives to view experiences 
3.1  Experiences from Positivistic paradigm 
In the beginning I need to start with the view of experiences from the positivist 
paradigm quoting the definition of Gall, Gall, and Borg (2003, cited in Wiersma and 
Jurs, 2005) as an example. 
 
The epistemological doctrine that physical and social reality is independent 
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What is observed in this view are hypothesizing of one true reality that is free from 
the contextual effects and the significance of establishing scientific knowledge in it. 
This view was developed through the 19th century along with the rise of 
experimental psychology attributing its basic stance to that of 17th century 
philosopher, Rene Descartes. 
 
In this perspective, “reality is seen as external and objective, summarized as time- 
and context-free generalizations which can be taken as causal laws” (Kohonen et al, 
2001, p. 12). Naturally the goals of positivistic research is in the explanation of 
phenomena with the cause-and-effect relationship using time- and context-free 
variables. No part of subjective comments can be counted in since they cannot be 
reduced to operationalized variables. Shön (1983) refers to this critical 
epistemological difference as follows: 
 
Practical knowledge exists, but it does not fit neatly into Positivist 
categories. We cannot readily treat it as a form of descriptive knowledge of 
the world, nor can we reduce it to the analytic schemas of logic and 
mathematics. (p. 33) 
 
As a result positivism allows no space for subjective personal experiences to take a 
role of useful resources for analyzing human behavior. Further, positivists’ strong 
belief in the final goal of generalizing the findings in a form of law has removed 
space for social contexts or history to be an important part of resourceful 
‘experience’ given their context-dependency. 
 
3.2  Experiences from experiential learning perspective 
3.2.1  Experience as a source of learning  
John Dewey’s greatest contribution to the education with his revolutionary idea of 
progressive education, which I believe lies in his introduction of ‘experience’ as a 
source of learning. He states, “I assume that amid all uncertainties there is one 
permanent frame of reference: namely, the organic connection between education 
and personal experience” (1938, p.25) and claims the necessity of a philosophy of 
education based on a philosophy of experience. This is the basic tenet of experiential 
learning advocating the immense possibility of experience as a source of learning. 
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Along with the rising concern on human action in the field of other areas, it is this 
rediscovery of experience as a source of learning that has opened ways to various 
types of practices and research: the most distinguished example of all is Action 
Research. Under this proposition, experience is not anything purely objective or 
generalizable but is something that can be discussed in terms of the meaning for 
subjective selves. The role of reflection stands as an act of making sense of 
experiences (Rodgers, 2002). 
 
3.2.2  Experience as an object of ‘reflection’ as a verb 
‘Reflection on experience’ implicates the relation between reflection and experience: 
Experience is the object of the verb ‘reflect’. In other words, reflection is directed to 
experience. Without this connection between reflection and experience, reflection 
becomes no different from mere thinking and we fall in the trap of looking back with 
no specific focuses or attention. I would like to further discuss the theoretical 
background behind this connection with a view to identify its significance.  
 
Based on the interpretation of John Dewey’s work, Rodgers (2002) put “a process of 
making meaning of experiences” as one of the basic features of reflection. She 
articulates the role of reflection lies in connecting education and experiences. 
Dewey(1938) says “experience and experiment are not self-explanatory ideas. 
Rather, their meaning is part of the problem to be explored” (p. 25). I interpret this 
as not any one of experiences stands by itself and its meanings do not unfold without 
the mediation of reflection. Experience needs examination. To focus on its role in 
practice, reflection is a means to examine and make meaning of experiences directed 
to experiences for further understanding. With this structural formulation that 
reflection is directed toward experience, it becomes possible to pin down the range 
of reflection and give it a clearer definition.  
 
In a similar vein, Kohonen et al. (2001) connected the value of experience with 
reflection as means of learning. They defined experiential learning as “learning from 
actual experience through reflection.”  
 
Putting these together, experiential learning as a form of pedagogy stands on 
experience as a source of learning, and reflection works as the sole means to make 
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meaning of experiences. Behind this lies the structural formulation that reflection is 
directed toward experience. 
 
Although not specifically from experientialism, the Phenomenological perspective 
provides powerful reasoning for this relationship. Referring to Husserl’s philosophy, 
Lindolf and Taylor (2002) state “Human consciousness is a fundamentally 
intentional activity, in the sense that intentions are always directed to objects” (p. 33). 
Considering that reflection is genuinely the work of consciousness which is given to 
something and putting ‘experience’ in the position of object in the sentence, 
reflection is identified as a conscious work on experience. This way experience is 
combined with reflection. 
 
3.2.3  Experience as continuity and interaction 
Besides the idea of experience as a resource of learning, three other orientations of 
experiences are entailed from Dewey (1938). First is the dynamic characteristics for 
growth. Terming every experience as ‘a moving force’, Dewey states that the value 
of experience can be judged only on what the ground of what it moves toward and 
into (p. 38). This means experience is not anything fixed or fixable but something 
that continues growing and it is us, the educators, who are to facilitate the process of 
growth. This dynamism he sees in experience is what reflective practitioner puts feet 
on. The critical awareness that I am participating in the process of growing 
experience determines my role as a practitioner.  
 
Dewey’s (1938) two interesting principles of experience: ‘continuity’ and 
‘interaction’ can be explained as two dimensions of the moving force (p. 44). 
Continuity, according to Dewey, is ‘longitudinal’ and emphasizes the need of 
experiences to get connected with each other for further experience. Continuity 
implicates that experience has a time domain as its essential quality and its meaning 
needs to be considered with historical context in view. Thus, experience as 
‘continuous process’ is open to past, present and the future.   
 
Another dimension of experience Dewey (1938) presented was ‘interaction’, which 
he says ‘lateral.’ With this lateral view, experience has earned the notion of social 
and situational context as well as spatial. Particularly emphasized in it is ‘the social 
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set-up’ of the situation in which a person is engaged (p. 45). In this line experience is 
not something that stays inside the individual or out of the context but is something 
dialogical with self and others and interacting with the environment. With 
‘environment’ Dewey means “whatever conditions interact with personal needs, 
desires, purposes, and capacities to create the experience which is had” (p. 44). To 
him, that individuals live in a world means they live in a series of situation, and ‘in’ 
means that “interaction is going on between an individual and objects and other 
persons” and the conceptions of situation and interaction are inseparable from each 
other (p. 43). This idea of situating individuals in the social context are in line with 
that of Socio-constructionism and also with that of Phenomenological perspectives; 
Husserl’s concept of ‘life world’ in particular. It is not quite clear how close Dewey 
got to with these ideas2, but these concepts seem to share the same vein although 
grown from different roots.  
 
These dynamic, temporal, spatial, and socio-cultural dimensions of experience add 
how experience as a source of learning has a complex quality to it.  
 
3.3  Experience from the phenomenological perspective 
3.3.1  Phenomenological views 
Phenomenology is a unique philosophy of the 20th century whose theoretical basis 
was made by the German philosopher Edmund Husserl. With the unfamiliarity of 
this thought in the field of practitioner research, I would like to seek its relevance to 
reflective practice by shedding lights on its key concepts from definitions.  
 
Taylor (2012) gives a simple account on Phenomenology in the forward of 
Merleau-Ponty’s seminal Phenomenology of Perception. 
 
Phenomenology is an attempt to describe the basic structures of human 
experience and understanding from a first person point of view, in contrast 
to the reflective, third person perspective that tends to dominate scientific 
knowledge and common sense. (p. viii) 
 
                                                     
2 Edmund Gustav Albrecht Husserl (1859~1938), Lev Vygotsky(1896-1934), John Dewey (1859-1952) 
35
Ken Tamai
14 
 
From the above account we learn phenomenology is a study of human experience 
from a subjective point of view, which presents a contrastive difference between 
researchers on phenomenology and those on the natural science paradigm. Viewing 
experiences from a subjective perspective, then, what do phenomenological 
researchers want to achieve? The following is provided by Manen (1990), 
phenomenological educationist. 
   
Phenomenology aims at gaining a deeper understanding of the nature or 
meaning of our everyday experiences. Phenomenology asks, “What is this 
or that kind of experience like?” (p. 9) 
 
What strikes us in terms of the goal of research is that phenomenology’s goal is in 
‘understanding’ of the nature or the meaning of experience and it doesn’t necessarily 
pursue actions or solutions. Crucially important here, however, is not a simple 
dependence on subjective statement. To approach experience from a 
phenomenological perspective we need to know whose experience it is and how it 
was experienced.  
 
Wiersma and Jurs (2005) describes phenomenology in their book on qualitative 
research method, referring to its unique way of viewing experiences,  
 
Phenomenology is the study of phenomenon; it stresses the careful 
description of phenomena from the perspective of those experiencing the 
phenomena. …If behavior is being observed, the phenomenologist does 
not simply note that a certain behavior has occurred, but attempts to 
understand what the behavior means to the persons being studied, and this 
emphasizes the subjective aspects of the behavior. (p. 243)  
 
They go further, 
  
There is little importance placed on what the educator thinks is going on; 
the importance is on understanding what the students are experiencing 
from their perspectives. (p. 243) 
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The phenomenological approach emphasizes that the meaning of reality is, 
in essence, in the “eyes and minds of the beholders,” the way the 
individuals being studied perceive their experiences. (p. 243) 
 
Thus, we find that the subjective viewpoint in phenomenology is not the simple 
first-person statement of the researcher but is a statement attempting to describe the 
reality of individuals in focus.  
 
Although quite limited in relation to identifying what it exactly is, what emerges out 
of above definitions are: 1) It is a study of experience and 2) aims at understanding 
the meaning of reality of/for the subject, and 3) it is an attempt to describe how the 
experience was experienced by the person in focus.  
 
Thus, the meaning Phenomenology has for reflective practice is invaluable in that it 
is first of all a philosophy for our experience in life: lived experience in its terms, 
and its primary focus is on how a phenomenon was experienced by a person and 
projected on the consciousness of the person in focus. Here, I would like to go 
further and introduce possible theoretical lenses from phenomenological perspective 
to view and describe experience.  
 
3.3.2  Phenomenological reduction as a tool to view experience 
Abstract notion that it is, phenomenological reduction is originally Hussearl’s idea 
and is also called ‘epoche’ or ‘bracketing.’ Manen (1990) values it as a way of 
practice to come to the essential structure of something. Referring to Merleau-Ponty, 
he lists four distinguishable types of reduction.  
 
1) Reduction involves the awakening of a profound sense of wonder and 
amazement at the mysteriousness of the belief in the world. 
2) One needs to overcome one’s subjective or private feelings, preferences, 
inclinations, or expectations that would prevent one from coming to 
terms with phenomenon or experience as it is lived through. 
3) One needs to strip away the theories or scientific conceptions and 
thematizations which overlay the phenomenon one wish to study, and which 
prevents one from seeing the phenomenon in a non-abstracting manner. 
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4) In the eidetic reduction one needs to see past or through the particularity 
of lived experience toward the universal, essence or eidos that lies on 
the other side of the concreteness of lived meaning. 
(p. 185) 
 
From the above, phenomenological reduction is understood as a fundamental and 
primary method for us to look at experience. By putting a bracket on known theories 
and knowledge we come to be able to view experience as it is. This can be said a 
sort of ‘unlearning practice’ to free us from any judgmental viewing of experiences 
in the world. When practitioners observe and describe experience, how to unleash us 
from own pre-given beliefs is a great challenge, and this stance of unlearning 
ourselves from known knowledge will help us stay away from judgmental 
evaluation leading us to genuine observation and description of experiences. 
 
3.3.3  Lived experience and the lifeworld 
Phenomenology shows us a unique take on experience in our life. ‘Lifeworld,’ 
originally the notion of Hussearl (1970a) along with phenomenological reduction, is 
explained by Manen (1990) as the lived world as experienced in everyday situations 
and relations. It is also the world as “already there,” “pre-given,” the world as 
experienced in the “natural, primordial attitude” (p. 182). Merleau-Ponty (2014) 
refers to the world in his view and described it as follows: “The world is not what I 
think, but what I live (p. lxxxiv). 
 
Combining above discussions, these experiences in phenomenology are not anything 
of decontextualized objective facts but of those experienced and understood by the 
subjective-self who lived the event in the moment right there. Naturally, an event is 
experienced and understood differently from person to person. Crucially important is 
whether or not we take a stance in describing a person’s experience in the way it was 
experienced. This I think is what makes the description of one’s experience so 
challenging. Much more important here may be whether or not we are sincerely 
concerned about our/others’ experiences and keep attending to the experience 
aiming at even a bit of better understanding.  
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How then can we approach this ambiguous and intangible notion of ‘lived 
experiences? Manen (1990) lists four existential themes as guides for reflection in 
the research process: lived space (spatiality), lived body (corporeality), lived time 
(temporality), and lived human relation (relationality or communality) (pp. 101-102). 
This means that we live in the lifeworld interacting spatially, bodily, temporarily and 
relationally with other social beings, and this vision opens us alternative new 
dimensions to approach experiences. Our life is grounded in this world and one’s 
lived meaning can be approached by attending to how the person perceives, 
understands and experiences the world in terms of space, body, time and relations.  
 
As a language teacher I think of the relationship between learners and their 
languages in the community (including dialects) and the possible meaning of the 
second language to them. A learner sitting with an uninterested face in front of me is 
an individual cultural and historical being. He may be here with too many negative 
experiences with English learning. With his Chinese background he may have a 
different body feel about the sound and the rhythm of English. He may still have 
genuine interest in learning English, but the English taught in my class may not be 
appealing to his needs or purposes. I wonder how my teaching is being experienced 
by this boy. If students’ learning experiences with my class are all different I would 
like to know about his experience of my teaching.  
 
Considering that individual histories, their interests, excitements, anxieties and even 
fears are all different, Kohonen (2001) writes as follows: 
 
The ‘use’ of the learner’s lived experience in teaching situations is a sign 
of respect for him or her as a whole person with his or her personal history; 
it is accepting the learner as the Other, as an independent human being, 
who has the full right and responsibility to build up his or her life-world 
and to find his or her own modes and strategies in learning. (p. 108)  
 
On the extension of Kohonen’s perspective is the take of a learner as a whole person 
who lives and shares this life world altogether. The perspective of looking at a 
learner in the life world prohibits us from looking at a learner out of context. They 
need to be looked at as beings whose existence is deeply rooted in the world and 
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history. Whether it is a teacher, a learner, a researcher or a parent, we are all 
existential beings in the life world interacting with each other. This is why the 
description of how the life was experienced becomes important.  
 
3.3.4  Inter-subjectivity 
Although possibly taken as some state in which shared understanding is constructed, 
it is not easy to reach a clear definition of this concept. Duranti (2010) sets the range 
of this notion “from acts in which one is minimally aware of the presence of an 
Other to acts in which one actively works at making sure that the Other and the Self 
are perceptually, conceptually, and practically coordinated around a particular task.” 
Crucial implication of this statement to a reflective practitioner is the unmistakable 
involvement of others in our experiences. Here the need of viewing experience in 
terms of subjectivity in between the Other and the Self arises. The Other in this case 
refers not only to those in the present but to those in the past. The notion of 
intersubjectivity, according to Duranti, provides us with a fundamental dimension of 
human experience and human sociability. 
 
Lindolf and Taylor (2002) describes intersubjectivity quoting the work of Shutz, the 
advocate of social phenomenology, as follows: 
 
Intersubjectivity is always produced in the relationships that we develop 
with others. In this primary “we-relations,” persons mutually occupy a 
time and place. Their actions are geared with respect to a common system 
of relevance.  
…Schutz noted that we imaginatively construct these relations not only 
with our contemporaries (whether known or unknown) but also with our 
predecessors. (p. 35) 
 
When applying the concept of intersubjectivity to the classroom context, the lived 
meaning of a learner’s experience needs to be analyzed in relation with others: 
teachers, friends, family members, their community and their previous experiences 
in the past as well. We are the beings grounded in this world interacting with each 
other. We meet learners with a purpose of teaching and we think they meet us to 
learn from us. Regardless of our positions, teachers and students meet and share life 
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in the classroom. The meaning of learning/teaching life, however, can be completely 
different if both start talking about the reality of leaning/teaching. Co-constructive 
understanding of lived life does not allow one-directional viewing of experience. 
Rather it needs to be analyzed as socially interactive process through the interaction 
of our body, emotion and beliefs with open-mindedness to the past, present and the 
future.  
       
3.4  Experience from the critical perspective 
Now I would like to shift my focus to the notion of power and awareness. Reflection 
has its self-critical orientation by nature, but what is lit up here is the significance of 
maintaining awareness on power in reflection attending to the relationship between 
self and his/her social context.  
 
Kincheloe (2008) lists Vygotsky as a central figure in the development of critical 
psychology and points out the connection between the social context and 
psychological processes of individuals. The argument of power is grounded on the 
understanding that we are social beings first of all. Fook (2006) articulates how 
individual experiences are to be looked at critically as part of reflective practice. It 
goes as follows. 
 
Individual experience may be seen as a microcosm of the social. This relies 
on an understanding of how knowledge and power are linked; how 
individuals participate in constructing knowledge (and therefore power); 
and how individuals act reflexively in their social worlds as agents, both 
constructing and responding to their environments.  
 
Characteristic in this view of experiences is that no one is free from social or 
cultural influences whether it is in learning or any other forms of interaction with the 
environment. Also closed up in the above statement is the possibility of involvement 
of individuals in the formation of power and ideology. An extension of this is, not 
only does an individual gets exploited by power but the same individual becomes 
the one who executes the power. Kincheloe (2008) tells us to return to democratic 
principles saying, “By nature, a question about democracy is a critical question 
because it always involves issues of power and its distribution” (p. 117). 
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Regarding the connection of knowledge with power, there is Paulo Freire’s famous 
discussion on the “banking” concept of education, in which knowledge is used as an 
instrument of oppression. Citing Beauvoir’s words Freire (2000) wrote:  
 
[t]he interests of the oppressors lie in “changing the consciousness of the 
oppressed, not the situation which oppresses them,” for the more the 
oppressed can be led to adapt to that situation, the more easily they can be 
dominated (p. 74). 
 
The question raised here is whether we are at all aware of this permeability of power 
impacting on us and also our own involvement in the use of it. This, of course, is not 
an easy scheme at all. McNiff (2013) comments this way: “People could not 
comment on their experience unless they understood how that experience was 
shaped by their own situatedness. They could not be free until they realized they 
were unfree” (p. 49). To carve out the structure of power enforcement in our daily 
life experience we may need not only some decent sensibility but the presence of a 
person who listens to our voices.  Richards (2003) gives the following account 
from the view of critical reflection with which to observe self.  
 
Reality, from this perspective, might be described as essentially coercive, 
and the process of research must therefore be seen as transformative and 
emancipatory: the researcher and the researched stand in a dialogic 
relationship in which the former seeks to bring about a change in the 
consciousness of the latter that will facilitate action designed to redress the 
unequal and oppressive structures that now have been exposed. (p. 40) 
 
To sense the use of power in our life is quite challenging, but the application of 
power as a concept definitely opens a new type of understanding in our life: how our 
lives have been exploited, what system is prepared to keep us remain unnoticed with 
the problems of the reality, who is behind all these and our involvement in it.  
Recent emphasis of early English education in Japan, for example, has been made a 
big social discourse by the MEXT3.  While voices of teaching other foreign 
languages are put away, Japanese students are taught English as if it were the only 
                                                     
3 The Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology 
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choice. Also, although it looks it is MEXT that controls this movement, the presence 
of such powerful business community as Keidanren4 cannot be dismissed, either. 
The notion of power carves out the structure of a grand scheme of producing 
Japanese workers who speak English and the involvement of teachers and 
researchers in it. 
 
In sum, I argue that in-depth attention to experience through a critical perspective 
will light up the unknown aspects of people’s lifeworld. What is expected of us is to 
sharpen our senses to know the complexity of power dynamics as none of us is free 
from this. Reflection on our experience may tell us to be open to our own possibility 
of getting involved in a power game as well as that of being exploited and oppressed 
in the structure of power. 
 
3.5  Experience in culture 
Aside from a positivistic paradigm, experience cannot be discussed without 
considering culture so long as we are situated and live ‘in’ it. The invariable role of 
the concept of culture for reflective practice is that none of our experience can be 
discussed without this ontological body of situation, the organic space in which 
meaning is generated. Regarding this meaning-making nature of culture, I need to 
quote from Geertz (1973): 
 
Believing, with Max Weber, that man is an animal suspended in webs of 
significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs, and the 
analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in search of law 
but an interpretive one in search of meaning. (p. 5) 
 
We are beings living in a web of meaning we spun ourselves is a striking metaphor 
describing the essential role of culture to human beings. Bruner (1996) introduces an 
idea of culturalism and tells how our minds are shaped and situated in culture; “that 
mind could not exist save for culture” (p. 3). Referring further to the process of our 
creation of meaning he states, 
 
                                                     
4  The Federation of Economic Organizations. Mizuno (2008) pointed out the direct influence of 
Keidanren’s suggestion to the policy of MEXT. 
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Meaning making involves situating encounters with the world in their 
appropriate cultural contexts in order to know “what they are about.” 
Although meanings are “in mind,” they have their origins and their 
significance in the culture in which they are created. (p. 3) 
 
Considering that ‘culture’ exists as a ground in which our life events are generated, 
reflective practitioners need to be alert to its essential importance in understanding 
experience.  
 
This concept of culture from an anthropological perspective is in accord with the life 
world in phenomenology, however, the description of experience will turn out 
different. While the anthropological perspective approaches experience exploring its 
symbolic meaning, the phenomenological perspective views in terms of how it was 
experienced through consciousness.  
 
3.6  Methodological perspective: Narrative and experience 
Here, I would like to discuss the relation of narrative and experience: how they are 
connected, referring to identifications in different fields. In the field of qualitative 
research narratives or stories takes a crucial role as a means of conducting research. 
Recognizing that reflective practice is a research method on experiences in life, 
narratives, or stories, become the most important approach to experience. Merriam 
(2009) states as follows: 
 
Stories are how we make sense of our experiences, how we communicate 
with others, and through which we understand the world around 
us. ..Stories, also called “narrative” have become a popular source of data 
in qualitative research. (p.32)  
 
Merriam’s statement confirms the rationality of story as a data source for the 
research with a reason that narratives tells us how experience was understood by the 
person engaged.  
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There are numerous accounts that refer to the narrative as a useful means to 
approach experience. I would like to introduce accounts by some philosophers as 
they consider it a powerful means that combines self with the world.  
 
Referring to Alexandre Kojeve, Noye (2009) writes that history exists in human 
memory but it exists only in the story we tell (p. 9). A simple interpretation of this is 
that if experience is not put into a story, history itself doesn’t exist. He also says that 
humans are story telling animals and we halt the merciless flow of time by telling 
stories and live life identifying selves in the thickness of memory and description 
(p. 18). Merleau-Ponty (2014), saying that philosophy is a radical form of reflection, 
makes an interesting comment exactly on this point, the relation between philosophy 
and history: “Since philosophy positions itself within history, it too draws upon the 
world and upon constituted reason. He further says, “through reflection we become 
responsible for our own history, but this responsibility also comes from a decision to 
which we commit our lives” (p. lxxxv). This entails philosophers, particularly those 
of phenomenology, claim themselves situated in history and engage themselves in 
the meaning-making process of this life world by means of reflection. 
 
Story, in this sense, is a constructed meaning of the world. This meaning 
construction process of lived world, according to Noye (2009), is the operation of 
transforming perceptual experience into hermeneutic experience and also is the 
theoretical basis that supports the act of storytelling (p. 18). 
   
3.7  Processual perspective: dynamics of time and reflection in experience 
Last is the processual feature of experience, i.e. experience-as-process perspective. 
The reason why experience is processual has been already discussed in previous 
sections.  
 
Dewey’s emphasis on continuity tells us that one experience is connected to the next 
experience for further learning so long as it is made open for a new meaning. In this 
sense, even experience as an event that is analyzed or interpreted never gets 
completed and thereby always open through past, present and future. 
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Schon’s (1983) famous typification of two kinds of reflection: ‘Reflection on action’ 
and ‘reflection in action’, clarifies the type of reflection according to the type of task 
engaged. The former is a reflection on an event that has happened and is finished 
already in the past, and the latter is a reflection of the event in which we are now 
engaged. The action in the former type of reflection is that of the objectified, while 
the latter action is on-going, contingent and in the process. Striking with the concept 
of reflection in action is that Schon never limits its temporal range to ‘now’. He 
positions experience from a more holistic viewpoint stating: 
 
“A practitioner’s reflection-in-action may not be very rapid. It is bounded 
by the “action-present,” the zone of time in which action can still make a 
difference to the situation. The action-present may stretch over minutes, 
hours, days, or even weeks or months, depending on the pace of activity 
and the situational boundaries that are characteristic of the practice (p. 62). 
 
The statement that reflection in action is bound by action-present is striking. 
Although it looks as if reflection in action is framed within a short period of time, it 
is not. Shön’s focus is not on time but on the process of action. The range of time 
happens to vary from a shot of moment to a duration of time as the result. The action 
here is a process. 
 
As this dynamic scope on time and process in reflective practice unfolds, I would 
like to replace Shön’s word ‘action’ with ‘experience’ to capture the processual 
aspect of reflection more appropriately. I suggest that use of experience connotes a 
broader conception including thoughts, emotions, conflicts, beliefs and all the other 
relevant responses of agents involved in experience. The word ‘action,’ meanwhile, 
possesses a sense of oneness and immediacy in it and does not necessarily match the 
notion of experience as a process that extends over a duration of time and expands 
its space across fields.  
 
Subjectivity in phenomenology presents an insight to the experience-as-a-process 
perspective. From a subjective point of view, temporality cannot be discussed on the 
Euclidian scale. A chat for a few seconds could be deeper in meaning and more 
inspirational than hours of conversation. An autistic child with no words may embed 
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incredible amount of information in a piece of drawing5. One exchange of smiles 
may be powerful enough to dissolve years of misunderstanding between friends.  
To describe these experiences we may [bracket] the familiar frameworks at hand and 
expose ourselves in their life world exploring a hint for understanding. What 
accounts as crucially important here is the stance of living the process together.  
 
4. Conclusion 
With the initial formulation that reflection is directed to experience, discussion has 
been made first on a set of essential orientations of reflection, and second on 
versatile dimensions of experience applying sets of theoretical frameworks: 
Experiential learning perspective, phenomenological perspective, critical perspective, 
cultural perspective, methodological perspective using narrative and the last, 
processual perspective.  
 
Examination of the characteristics of experience with these epistemological lenses 
carved out the complex and dynamic nature of experience. It is no way a simple act 
but a very dynamic, profound and powerful practice that should be grounded in our 
life world. Moreover, with this complexity and different facets of experience being 
lit up with multiple theoretical lights, it may prove the impossibility of one 
single-cut definition, which could be the reason for the theoretical ambiguity of 
reflective practice. 
 
This, however, doesn’t negate the necessity of defining reflective practice.  Rather, 
the process of defining itself carries much more important meaning than before with 
its demands for meta-cognitive understanding on reflecting on experience: the 
responsibility of articulating the practitioner-researcher’s viewpoint, in other words. 
Because experience has different dimensions, a practitioner-researcher may need to 
be well aware of his/her own perspectives and articulate what he/she is looking at 
and how. Depending on the purpose, it may not be enough to look at experience 
from one direction with one perspective. Meanwhile there are a variety of theoretical 
lenses available for reflective practice in view of understanding experience.  
 
 
                                                     
5 Yuge (2015) discussed the impact of this moment in her master’s thesis.  
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Acknowledging the complexity of experience and the entailed broadness and depth 
of reflective practice, I would like to propose six dimensions from which to 
approach experiences. They are life-world, socio-cultural, temporal, interactional, 
processual, and power (See Fig. 1). 
 
 
Fig. 1 Six dimensions of viewing experience 
 
Defining reflection should now be in the hands of the practitioner-researcher who 
live the experience themselves, and not only that, it is their responsibility to 
articulate their ways of reflecting experience, asking themselves which lens they 
would like to choose and for what. 
 
Conclusion of this discussion is summarized below:  
1) Reflection is directed toward experience.  
2) Reflective practice is a process of understanding experience. 
3) Experience is a complex, dynamic and multi-dimensional process which is 
always open to new understanding. 
4) The complexity and multi-dimensional feature of experience may be a reason of 
versatile definitions and theoretical ambiguity of reflective practice. 
5) Due to this complexity and multi-dimensionality of experience, practitioner- 
researchers are expected to articulate their own epistemological frameworks to 
view experience. 
Experience
Interactional Temporal
Socio-
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Life-
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6) Use of versatile theories will help with achieving richer accounts of experience. 
7) We need to be aware of the use of multiple perspectives to approach experience 
through reflective practice. 
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6) Use of versatile theories will help with achieving richer accounts of experience. 
7) We need to be aware of the use of multiple perspectives to approach experience 
through reflective practice. 
 
Analysis on experience probably has many more doors for entry, but these six 
dimensions may be a good initial portal to reflect on experience with a view of 
expanding our understanding on lived life. Numerous experiences buried inside us 
or in the space between others, or in the moment right now are waiting to be heard 
with stories. Simply, reflective practice is a way to hear voices that are not voiced 
yet.   
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